

RESEARCH

BULLETIN

SELF, VALUES, AND AFFECTS:
DERIVATIONS FROM TOMKINS' POLARITY THEORY

Rae Carlson
Educational Testing Service

and

Nissim Levy
Howard University

This Bulletin is a draft for interoffice circulation. Corrections and suggestions for revision are solicited. The Bulletin should not be cited as a reference without the specific permission of the authors. It is automatically superseded upon formal publication of the material.

Educational Testing Service
Princeton, New Jersey
June 1969

SELF, VALUES, AND AFFECTS: DERIVATIONS FROM TOMKINS' POLARITY THEORY

Rae Carlson

and

Nissim Levy

Educational Testing Service

Howard University

Abstract

Tomkins' polarity theory (1963b, 1965) proposes that ideologies in many domains may be described in terms of a very general humanistic-normative polarity and rest upon more basic loosely organized "ideo-affective postures" reflecting cognitive-affective dynamics derived from socialization experiences. Tomkins' theory provided the basis for three empirical studies exploring the personality context of ideo-affective postures. In Study 1, the humanistic-normative polarity (assessed by "taste" or "smell" imagery) was significantly related to interpersonal versus individualistic bases of self-conception and of value hierarchy in 202 Negro College students. Study 2 systematically varied affective imagery and social-personal orientation and found both variables significantly related to judgments of facial expressions of emotion in an initial study and in a replication ($N_s = 40$). Study 3 found humanistic-normative affective imagery related to students' ($N = 20$) affective responsiveness in a science education class. The results of all three studies offer clear support for Tomkins' formulation by demonstrating the role of ideo-affective postures in organizing personal judgments and choices and encourage further inquiry on basic cognitive-affective dynamics in personality.

SELF, VALUES, AND AFFECTS: DERIVATIONS FROM TOMKINS' POLARITY THEORY^{1, 2}

Rae Carlson

and

Nissim Levy

Educational Testing Service

Howard University

Tomkins (1963b, 1965) has presented a theory of the structure of ideology which promises to unify much existing knowledge by demonstrating a very general polarity underlying diverse beliefs, attitudes, and values in widely separate domains. Reviewing the major controversies enduring through several centuries of Western thought, Tomkins points out that a fundamental distinction between humanistic and normative orientations toward life can be discerned in such disparate fields as mathematical theory, literature, political philosophy, child-rearing practices, and even between and within areas of academic psychology. Tomkins (1965) poses the polarity as follows:

The issues are simple enough. Is man the measure, an end in himself, an active, creative, thinking, desiring, loving force in nature? Or must man realize himself, attain his full stature only through struggle toward, participation in, conformity to a norm, a measure, an ideal essence basically prior to and independent of man? (p. 79).

At a descriptive level, the humanistic-normative ideological polarity bears an obvious resemblance to several more familiar polarities: James' (1890) "tough-tendermindedness," Eysenck's (1954) "radicalism-conservatism," Adorno's (1950) "authoritarian-nonauthoritarian," and Rokeach's (1960) "open-closed mindedness," among many others. However, the ideological polarity theory is at once more general--crossing the content domains which define the more familiar dichotomies--and more explicit in linking the individual's ideological posture to (a) developmental factors in socialization experiences, and (b) the affective-cognitive organizations which underlie one's construction

of current experience. Moreover, the ideological polarity theory is potentially more powerful than most existing formulations, since it should enable the prediction of an individual's response to yet unencountered ideologies, and should ultimately permit differentiation of persons who subscribe to the same ideological content for dynamically different reasons (Tomkins, in press).

At the risk of severely oversimplifying a complex and subtle theory, relevant aspects of Tomkins' (1965), formulation may be summarized as follows. One's ideological position in any domain is based upon a more fundamental, implicit "set of loosely organized feelings and ideas about feelings" (p. 74) which may become engaged by ideology with exposure to compatible organized beliefs in any sphere. It is this "ideo-affective posture" upon which organized ideology is developed through a process of resonance, as ideology engages more fundamental beliefs and feelings. Tomkins (1965) notes:

The distinction which we have drawn between the basic ideo-affective postures and ideology proper is a fundamental one.... Yet it should be noted that the ideo-affective postures contain all the components which will be expressed more articulately in the organized ideology, even if this latter is never attained....If our theory is correct, however, it should be possible to predict from the basic ideo-affective postures to what ideological postures the individual would resonate if he were to be sufficiently exposed to these domains (pp. 78-79).

The basic humanistic or normative orientation has its roots in the developmental history of socialization of affect; particularly important are the consequences of socialization which lead one to maintain an open, accepting, or a defended, rejecting posture toward experience and toward people.

Given a fundamental humanistic or normative posture, one's resonance to ideology in any domain should have a degree of coherence and consistency.

Left- and right-wing ideologies,³ regardless of content, embody a set of basic assumptions about the intrinsic reality and value of man, and a set of attitudes toward the expression or control of man's basic affects, drives, and potentialities (Tomkins, 1963b). These basic assumptions, recurring in many ideologies, are represented in the Polarity Scale (Tomkins, 1966), an instrument explicitly designed to measure ideological polarity.

Empirical support for the polarity theory to date (Tomkins, 1965) includes (a) demonstration of the consistency of humanistic and normative orientations across many content domains in responses to the Polarity Scale, (b) evidence that humanistic or normative positions on the Polarity Scale are significantly correlated with sociophilic and sociophobic responses on a projective test (Tomkins-Horn Picture Arrangement Test--Tomkins & Miner, 1957), and (c) established effectiveness of the Polarity Scale in predicting how subjects resolve the perceptual conflict produced by stereoscopic presentation of two faces, one portraying positive affect, and the other portraying negative affect. Recent work (Tsurumi, 1969) further suggests the generality of polarity theory for non-Western subjects.

The present investigation consists of three exploratory studies undertaken in the context of research on qualitative patterns of personality organization. Although directed toward construct validation of polarity theory, the present inquiry departed from the study of ideology per se to focus upon the more primitive representations of "ideo-affective postures" in affective imagery.

Ideo-affective postures play a key role in Tomkins' theory. As the basis of the individual's ideological commitments, limiting and structuring one's

potential resonance to ideologies, the ideo-affective postures derive their strength and importance from their role as personality variables reflecting enduring dispositions derived from socialization experiences. Thus, ideo-affective postures should be related not only to ideological postures, but to a range of personal responses, judgments, and choices outside the ideological domain. The present investigation explored the personological anchoring of ideo-affective postures as fundamental to further empirical study of ideological polarity.

In Tomkins' theory, the fundamental humanistic-normative polarity, at the level of ideo-affective postures, is best seen in individuals' responses to distress, and in the contrast between responses of shame and contempt evoked by distress. Affective imagery has been used in assessing this aspect of the polarity: an item from the Polarity Scale asks subjects to describe distress experience in terms of a "bad taste" or a "bad smell." According to Tomkins, taste imagery implies a humanistic orientation and a degree of openness to experience: to have tasted and spit out an unpleasant substance or experience, one must have exposed oneself by taking it in. Conversely, "smell" imagery implies a normative orientation, and a contemptuous rejection--from a safe distance--of unpleasant substance or experience. Originally considered a covert measure of ideological posture (Tomkins, 1965), the taste-smell item is now considered to be a measure of ideo-affective posture (Tomkins, personal communication, June 1969). Two evidences of the validity of affective imagery as a measure of the humanistic-normative polarity are currently available: (a) the significant relationship of taste-smell imagery to ideological posture in responses to the Polarity Scale (Tomkins, 1965), and (b) the finding that the use of taste or smell imagery in describing reactions to the assassination

of President Kennedy was related to the incidence of reported crying about his death (Tomkins, McCarter, & Peebles, 1965).

Study 1. Social-Personal Orientation, Values, and Affective Imagery

The first study attempted to test two derivations from Tomkins' theory: that a predominantly humanistic or normative orientation should be reflected in (a) how an individual construes himself, and (b) his personal hierarchy of values.

Although the humanistic-normative polarity is not intrinsically equivalent to a sociophilic-sociophobic polarity (i.e., "left-wing" ideology includes emphases upon both interpersonal closeness and individualistic detachment, while "right-wing" ideology emphasizes maintaining appropriate interpersonal distance), several lines of thought (cf. Tomkins, 1965) suggest that, as an historically limited phenomenon, in current American society humanistically oriented persons should emphasize interpersonal relatedness in conceptions of self and in value structures, while normatively oriented persons should more often stress individualistic qualities.

Definition of one's self in primarily interpersonal or individualistic terms has been studied in a series of investigations of social-personal orientation. Previous work with this variable established relationships of social-personal orientation to parental identification and self-esteem in preadolescents (Carlson, 1963), to sex differentiation in adolescent development (Carlson, 1965), to sex differences and to variables of Jungian typology in adults (Carlson & Levy, 1968). Thus, social-personal orientation appears to describe a coherent pattern of qualitative differences between those who see

themselves as intrinsically involved with other people and those who do not. In terms of the present formulation of Tomkins' theory, socially oriented persons should be humanistic, and personally oriented individuals basically normative in ideo-affective posture.

A relevant index of humanistic-normative basis of personal value hierarchy is less readily available, since most standard measures of values focus upon object-centered sentiment structures, measuring preferences or behavioral choices influenced by education, opportunities, or subcultural values. However, the work of Erikson (1964) suggests a schema of personal values of considerable generality, universality, and subjective meaning. Erikson has proposed that the rudiments of ego strength are to be found in human qualities which he terms "virtues." These basic human strengths are developed sequentially in a timetable which parallels the more familiar stages of psychosexuality, psychosocial crises, and cognitive maturation. Once achieved, these virtues remain as basic ingredients of ego strength. Within the "virtue" sequence (Hope, Will, Purpose, Competence, Fidelity, Love, Care, and Wisdom) two triads may be identified--one clearly "earlier" and "individualistic" (Will, Purpose, Competence), and the other clearly "later" and "interpersonal" (Fidelity, Love, Care). In terms of the present formulation of polarity theory, humanistic persons should resonate more to the "interpersonal" virtues, and normative persons to the "individualistic" virtues.

Measures. Social-personal orientation was measured by the Carlson Adjective Checklist (Carlson & Levy, 1968). On this instrument, a subject describes himself by choosing 10 terms from a set of 30 socially desirable adjectives. One is classified as socially oriented if choices of social terms (requiring

an implicit social object--e.g., "friendly," "persuasive," etc.) exceed choices of personal terms (which do not require a social object--e.g., "ambitious," "idealistic," etc.).

Value hierarchy was assessed by means of a paired comparison task in which subjects indicated the relative importance of each of Erikson's (1964) eight virtues paired with every other. The sum of ranks for the "early-individualistic" triad of Will, Purpose, Competence and for the "later-interpersonal" triad of Commitment, Love, Care was obtained for each subject. (Erikson's term "fidelity" was translated as "commitment" since preliminary work indicated that "fidelity" had rather narrow, misleading connotations for many subjects.) Choices of Hope and Wisdom were omitted from the analysis since neither term has clearly interpersonal or individualistic connotations.

Affective imagery was assessed by Tomkins' taste-smell item, modified as follows: "Imagine a very unpleasant situation. Would you be more likely to characterize it as: (a) having a bad smell, or (b) leaving you with a bad taste? Write the word Smell or the word Taste to indicate which way you'd be most likely to characterize the situation."

Subjects and procedure. All measures were administered during regular class periods to 202 Negro college students (52 males, 150 females) in psychology classes at Howard University. Subjects were classified dichotomously on variables of affective imagery, social-personal orientation, and value hierarchy. On the basis of preliminary work suggesting that all three variables are related to sex, separate analyses were made for males and females. Predicted relationships were evaluated with chi-square tests; since all hypotheses involved directional predictions, one-tailed tests were used.

Results. The findings clearly supported both hypotheses. Affective imagery was related to self-conception in males ($\chi^2 = 4.39$, $p < .05$) and in females ($\chi^2 = 4.86$, $p < .05$), with Tasters describing themselves in interpersonal, and Smellers in individualistic terms. The predicted relationship between humanistic-normative affective imagery and value hierarchy was also confirmed for both sexes. Tasters gave higher ratings to the later-interpersonal virtue triad and Smellers preferred the early-individualistic virtue triad. The chi-square values of 5.91 for males and 4.68 for females are significant at the .05 level.

Study 2. Affective Imagery, Social-Personal Orientation, and Judgments
of Facial Expression

The second study was undertaken in order to explore the roles of ideoaffective posture and of self-conception in judgments of social objects, using an experimental design in which affective imagery and social-personal orientation were varied simultaneously.

The basic hypothesis was derived from Tomkins' (1963b) formulation of attitude toward affect in the ideological polarity:

Nowhere is the polarity between the right and left sharper than in attitudes toward man's affects. The left has positive affects toward affects per se and is at home in the realm of feeling. The right is uneasy about and intolerant of affect per se, lest it endanger norm attainment (p. 401).

Further, left and right show differential selectivity to the positive and negative affects, and here the left assumes that "this differential selectivity should be governed by the general strategy of maximizing positive and minimizing negative affects" (Tomkins, 1963b, p. 410).

This reasoning led to the first hypothesis: Humanistically oriented persons are more likely than normatively oriented persons to see other people as experiencing pleasant emotions.

The second hypothesis predicted that persons who define themselves in primarily interpersonal terms should be more open to seeing others as experiencing pleasant emotions, as compared with those who construe themselves in individualistic terms. This hypothesis was derived from previous work on social-personal orientation (Carlson & Levy, 1968) indicating that socially oriented subjects are more invested in others and more attuned to emotional modes of experience, in contrast to the personally oriented subjects' preference for subjective and intellectual modes. This hypothesis was further directed toward testing the conceptual independence of social-personal orientation from the humanistic-normative polarity.

Subjects. Forty subjects were chosen from 415 Negro students in psychology classes at Howard University who had previously taken the Carlson Adjective Checklist and Tomkins' taste-smell item. Four subgroups of 10 subjects each, with equal representation of males and females, were constituted: Personally oriented Smellers, personally oriented Tasters, socially oriented Smellers, and socially oriented Tasters. Since the distribution of scores on the adjective checklist was markedly skewed (toward low personal orientation) in this population, many cases had to be discarded in arriving at the four equal subgroups required by this design.

Procedure. Photographs portraying facial expressions of emotions were used as stimulus materials. From the Lightfoot facial expression series (Engen, Levy, & Schlosberg, 1957) the 25 pictures with the most neutral scale values on the "pleasantness-unpleasantness" dimension were selected. Subjects, tested

individually, were presented with 25 pictures in random order and asked to judge whether each picture portrayed a pleasant or an unpleasant experience. The number of "pleasant" judgments constituted S's score.

Results. Effects of affective imagery and social-personal orientation were assessed by analysis of variance. Mean "pleasant" judgments for the four subgroups were as follows: Personal Smellers, 8.5; Personal Tasters, 10.6; Social Smellers, 12.5; Social Tasters, 17.6. Main effects of affective imagery and social-personal orientation were significantly ($p < .05$) related to judgments of facial expression; no interaction effects or sex effects were obtained.

A replication of this procedure with another 40 subjects from the same population confirmed the findings. Subgroup means of "pleasant" judgments were as follows: Personal Smellers, 10.2; Personal Tasters, 14.4; Social Smellers, 13.2; Social Tasters, 15.0. Again, analysis of variance results indicated significant ($p < .05$) main effects of affective imagery and social-personal orientation, along with no significant sex or interaction effects.

Study 3. Affective Imagery and Responsiveness to an Educational Experience

The third study attempted to take advantage of a field situation adapted to testing of two predictions from polarity theory: (a) differential reactions of humanistic and normative subjects to a distinctly humanistic approach to physical science, and (b) differential affective engagement of humanistic and normative persons in a learning situation.

The occasion for Study 3 was the introduction of an innovative science education course into the curriculum of a state college. In contrast to traditionally structured, reality and methodology oriented science courses, the new

course offered a highly unstructured, discovery oriented approach to science and to teaching. The course was considered demanding, challenging, and controversial by the students.

Specific hypotheses of the study were: (1) Humanistic students, as compared with normative students, should resonate more to a humanistic philosophy of science, and this resonance should be reflected in more positive evaluations of this course; (2) humanistic ideology, with its "approbation of affect" and the strategy of minimizing affect inhibition (Tomkins, 1963b, p. 407) should lead the humanistic student to experience and express more affective engagement in the course, regardless of his evaluation of the course.

Subjects. Twenty students (7 males, 13 females; ages 20-47) enrolled in the special science education course at California State College, Fullerton, participated in the study. Students were predominantly social science, arts, and humanities majors (only two Ss were psychology majors) taking the course to meet requirements for elementary or secondary education credentials.

Measures. With the cooperation of the course instructor (a humanistically oriented physicist who was unacquainted with either Tomkins' polarity theory or the specific hypotheses of this investigation) a student experimenter⁴ devised a 30-item checklist questionnaire to assess students' enjoyment of the course and acceptance of the teaching method as an approach to science. Included in the questionnaire was a set of affect terms to describe students' feelings when beginning and completing assignments in the course. Two scores were derived from the questionnaire: (a) an Attitude score (consisting of endorsements of the teaching method, judgments of its relevance to science instruction at various grade levels, judgments of the importance of structure and discipline

in presenting science, and reports of positive affects in relation to course work); and (b) an Affect score, consisting of the number of feelings (positive or negative) reported. Split-half correlations, corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula, suggested adequate reliability of both Attitude ($r = .90$) and Affect ($r = .76$) measures. Humanistic-normative ideo-affective postures were assessed, as before, by Tomkins' taste-smell item.

Procedure. Data were collected during a regular class period late in the semester. Subjects were classified as Tasters ($n = 15$) or Smellers ($n = 5$); scores on attitude and affect measures were ranked. Relationships of affective imagery to evaluation of the course and to affective responsiveness were tested with the Mann-Whitney U test. Since hypotheses involved directional predictions, one-tailed tests were used. As a check upon possible bias attributable to contaminating variables, relationships were also examined by comparing the five Smellers with a subsample of five Tasters individually matched for age, sex, and academic major.

Results. The predicted relationship of humanistic orientation to positive evaluation of the course was not supported; Tasters were no more favorable in attitude than were Smellers in either the total sample or the matched subgroups. While several factors may have contributed to the nonconfirmation of this prediction, the most plausible interpretation suggests that students may have been responding to physics per se (a "right-wing" field alien to students' major commitments) as much as to the "left-wing" philosophy of science of the particular course; obviously a control group of students exposed to a traditional, right-wing science course would be required for an adequate test of this hypothesis.

The second hypothesis, predicting greater affective responsiveness in humanistic students, was clearly confirmed in the total sample ($U = 16.5$; $p < .05$) and in the matched subgroups (sign test, $p = .031$), with Tasters consistently expressing more affects--both positive and negative--as compared with Smellers.

Discussion

Taken together, the results of three small exploratory studies--despite their obvious limitations of small samples, primitive measures, and modest magnitudes of relationship--offer support for the heuristic value of Tomkins' theory in organizing phenomena of personal judgments and choices. That so simple an event as the use of "taste" or "smell" imagery predicts how persons conceive of themselves, the priorities they assign to basic human strengths, their interpretations of another's emotional experience, and their affective responsiveness to an educational experience (with two of these relationships established in replications) suggests that a basic cognitive-affective organization underlies a wide range of theoretically important variables.

The present findings support Tomkins' conception of ideo-affective postures as reflecting basic personality dispositions, and encourage further exploration of ideo-affective postures as critical structures linking personality dynamics to ideological commitment. The findings also suggest that further research directed toward elucidation of basic cognitive-affective dynamics (as developed by Tomkins-- 1962, 1963a) may prove to be at least as relevant as inquiry directed at mapping the domain of ideological content.

While the results of the present studies point to generality of the humanistic-normative polarity across a variety of tasks, and across samples differing

in race, sex, and geographic region, some possible limitations upon generality stemming from related work should be noted. Previous research on the dependent variables of the present study (Carlson, 1969a, 1969b; Carlson & Levy, 1968) suggests that sex differences and race-sex interactions may be anticipated in further inquiry. Moreover, several lines of evidence suggest that the developmental level of subjects may constrain the generality of the relationships reported here. Earlier work on social-personal orientation (Carlson, 1965) suggests that sex-typed individualistic or interpersonal bases of self-regard do not develop until late adolescence. It is likely that stable value structures--as well as stable bases of self-conception--are not established at developmental levels before late adolescence.⁵ Such a formulation is strongly suggested by Erikson's (1950) conceptualization of "identity versus role diffusion" as the psychosocial crisis of this period.

The considerations of developmental perspective and sex differences point to areas in which further development of the basic theory may be useful. Since a major source of the power of Tomkins' theory lies in its elucidation of basic cognitive-affective dynamics underlying the level of verbalized ideology, these lacunae in current affect and ideology theory may be important. There is considerable evidence that affects are differently organized in males and females (Carlson, 1969b; Maccoby, 1966). Further, "socialization of affect"--basic to Tomkins' ideological polarity theory--implies the need for specification of the critical periods and relationships involved in development.

Finally, some methodological implications may be noted. Results of the present studies support Allport's (1942) suggestion that brief, direct measures--when they are guided by theoretical conceptualization and are intrinsically

relevant to subjects' experience of themselves and their own lives--may provide information about personality organization which does not depend upon elaborate measurement technology.

The need for broadening the basis for assessment of ideo-affective postures is obvious. While affective imagery of taste or smell serves as a reliable index of this basic polarity, the development of alternative measures based upon Tomkins' conceptualization would seem to be a promising and important step. One further derivation from polarity theory may be noted: that qualitative, typological measurement approaches may serve better than current dimensional approaches in capturing basic patterns of personality organization.

References

- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, J. J., & Sanford, R. N. The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper, 1950.
- Allport, G. W. The use of personal documents in psychological science. (Bulletin 49) New York: Social Science Research Council, 1942.
- Carlson, R. Identification and personality structure in preadolescents. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963, 67, 566-573.
- Carlson, R. Stability and change in the adolescent's self-image. Child Development, 1965, 36, 659-666.
- Carlson, R. On the structure of self-esteem: Comments on Ziller's formulation. Research Bulletin 69-38. Princeton, N. J.: Educational Testing Service, 1969. (a)
- Carlson, R. Sex differences in ego functioning: Exploratory studies of agency and communion. Paper presented at the meetings of the Eastern Psychological Association, Philadelphia, 1969. (b)
- Carlson, R., & Levy, N. A brief method of assessing social-personal orientation. Psychological Reports, 1968, 23, 911-914.
- Engen, T., Levy, N., & Schlosberg, H. A new series of facial expressions. American Psychologist, 1957, 12, 264-266.
- Erikson, E. H. Childhood and society. New York: Norton, 1950.
- Erikson, E. H. Insight and responsibility. New York: Norton, 1964.
- Eysenck, H. The psychology of politics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954.
- James, W. Principles of psychology. New York: Holt, 1890.
- Maccoby, E. (Ed.) The development of sex differences. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966.

- Rokeach, M. The open and closed mind. New York: Basic Books, 1960.
- Tomkins, S. S. Affect, imagery, consciousness. (2 vols.) New York: Springer, 1962; 1963. (a)
- Tomkins, S. S. Left and right: A basic dimension of ideology and personality. In R. W. White, (Ed.), The study of lives. New York: Atherton, 1963. Pp. 388-411. (b)
- Tomkins, S. S. Affect and the psychology of knowledge. In S. S. Tomkins, & C. E. Izard, (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and personality. New York: Springer, 1965.
- Tomkins, S. S. The Polarity Scale. New York: Springer, 1966.
- Tomkins, S. S. Marx: The child, the man, and his theory. New York: Springer, in press.
- Tomkins, S. S., McCarter, R., & Peebles, A. Reactions to the assassination of President Kennedy. In S. S. Tomkins, & C. E. Izard, (Eds.), Affect, cognition and personality. New York: Springer, 1965.
- Tomkins, S. S., & Miner, J. B. Tomkins-Horn Picture Arrangement Test. New York: Springer, 1957.
- Tsurumi, K. Social change and the individual: Japan before and after defeat in World War II. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1969, in press.

Footnotes

¹Preparation of this manuscript was supported by the first author's USPHS Special Fellowship, administered by Educational Testing Service, Princeton, N. J. Portions of this research were presented to the 1968 meetings of the Eastern Psychological Association and the Western Psychological Association.

²We are grateful to S. S. Tomkins and L. J. Stricker for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.

³The terms "left wing" and "right wing" in Tomkins' theory are not equivalent to popular usage connoting liberal versus conservative political philosophy; to avoid miscommunication, the essentially equivalent terms "humanistic" and "normative" are used here to describe the basic polarity in both ideoaffective postures and in ideologies.

⁴We are indebted to Lorrie Pike for conceiving this study and for collecting basic data as a project in an undergraduate personality course under the direction of the first author. The present authors assume responsibility for analyses and interpretations reported here.

⁵A pilot study of individualistic-interpersonal value orientations of early adolescents (ages 13-16) in sharply differentiated "liberal" and "conservative" church groups failed to reveal any coherent relationships of ideology and value hierarchy.